Playing to Win: Indo-Pacific Strategy and Partnerships to Deter China By Katie Wheelbarger

A Response By Katie Wheelbarger

Dale Swartz’s Reaganesque optimism in the face of the daunting China challenge is surely appropriate for this Reagan Institute venue. With confidence and hope, he notes that “we have all the tools to compete and win in the new era of strategic competition.” Plus, with an organizing concept of “strategic distance,” he argues we can harness U.S. military, diplomatic, technological, and ideological tools to counter this century-long challenge. But is this optimism so warranted? Can we act with appropriate urgency?

Reviewing a few embedded assumptions and conclusions in his piece provides an opportunity to further review the nature and urgency of the challenge.

• Is competition with China primarily a century-long challenge—or is China already part of a present and perhaps expanding global conflict?

The idea of “strategic distance” is intended to shape the bipartisan energy to confront an antagonistic China. Like the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the concept recognizes competition with China as an enduring, multi-generational challenge requiring use of all U.S. tools. Indeed, if Beijing has the power to displace Washington, our network of alliances, the international institutions we lead, and the global economy underpinned by the U.S. dollar, it is understandable to be focused on this threat while having a relatively higher risk tolerance for other regional challenges.

On the other hand, the current wars in Europe and the Middle East illustrate that U.S. policymakers are not afforded the luxury of ignoring crises that loom outside the Indo-Pacific. These conflicts not only impact U.S. economic and security interests directly, but they also provide China the opportunity to oppose us indirectly through collaboration and support to other rogue nations.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in particular has been a catalyst of greater Russia-China cooperation. It has been reported that U.S. officials confirmed China provided Russia with cruise missiles and drone engines and is helping Russia improve Moscow’s satellite and space-based capabilities.¹ Similarly, cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea suggests that viewing China competition as the singular threat may not be the best lens for the United States and our allies to appreciate and adapt to the dynamic international system.² A metric that compares our competition with China in five- or ten year increments similarly risks undervaluing the scope of the present global challenge.

• Is the U.S. preoccupation with a Taiwan scenario ‘myopic’?

Much has been written about the “Davidson window” as the potential 2027 timeline for China to take military action against Taiwan.³ Such dire warnings helped drive some important decision-making and resourcing for U.S. capabilities, infrastructure, and support to partners and allies in the region. Similarly, the nature of the Taiwan challenge also allowed U.S. defense officials to adjust to an asymmetric fight in the Indo-Pacific. Even with the increased attention, though, the resourcing to support Taiwan has been frustratingly slow, with authorities and appropriations only provided relatively recently, most specifically with the recently passed National Security Supplemental.⁴

The urgency of that potential scenario encouraged U.S. policy makers to increase our presence in the region, buttress our allies and partners, improve global resilience in the semiconductor and microelectronics industry, and focus on China’s military modernization.⁵ Thus, while it is certainly true that China’s activities across the theater are broader than a Taiwan scenario, it may not be in our interest to jettison that focus while it is finally resulting in change.

• Is “strategic distance” both a useful organizing concept for policy makers as well as an effective communications tool?

While the notion of “strategic distance” has the benefit of organizing our thinking about available policy tools, the use of the term arguably creates a false impression that the United States can create a safe distance from the threat. The isolationist thread that runs through our history is encouraged by our geographic location and our relatively safe neighborhood. Thus, an organizing concept that advances the idea of distance from the threat may have the unintended effect of amplifying the isolationist instincts in many Americans and not effectively communicate the urgency and ubiquitousness of the threat.

The Defense Enterprise

Swartz concludes with several appropriate questions to spawn discussion: how can we craft an industrial policy, provide for a sufficient defense budget, and develop a technology investment plan with an apathetic/isolationist public and an American democracy needing renewal? Policymakers perhaps reentering government service may be most interested in understanding not only the domain of activity but what specific actions ought to be taken to shore up our position.

One of Swartz’s key recommendations is to maintain a credible military deterrent across domains. That surely requires, at a minimum, (1) an increase in key capabilities and capacity and (2) more rapid adoption at scale of advanced technologies. Many leaders—including those within the DOD, Congress, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Commission—have highlighted that the current defense enterprise is neither designed nor incentivized to do either, much less both at the same time. While pilot projects and marginal process changes have been proposed and sometimes implemented, we cannot assume that our system is able to respond to advancing threats— even with increased spending.

After the Ukraine conflict, many in the Washington ecosystem were hopeful that the apparent urgency and capacity required for modern warfare would force needed change in the defense enterprise. And yet, capacity increases are lagged by contract negotiation timelines, supply chain woes, risk aversion, continued debate about long-term demand, and capability tradeoffs. Today, we have institutions that reflect learned behavior from the past 60 years and are designed for maximizing cost efficiencies at the expense of time. Fundamentally, leaders around the world have noted the increased value of time: they want military capability and advanced technology faster.⁶

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s introductory note to his 2022 National Defense Strategy stated firmly that “[i]n these times, business as usual at the Department is not acceptable.”⁷ Unfortunately, despite our best intentions, the inertia of the defense enterprise means we are doing exactly that. If the China threat is as large, global, and present as evidence suggests, U.S. leaders must not only talk about doing things differently, but they must force the system to do so.